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I. I NTRODUCTION 
1. Paper’s Scope 
In this paper, I tackle the question whether one share  one vote should become a European 
law rule. In order ultimately to provide an answer, I proceed as follows. In this section, I briefly 
consider the recommendations by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on the regulation 
of pre-bid defences and criticisms raised by the same. In section II, I examine the economic theory 
concerning one share  one vote and its optimality, and the law and economics literature on dual 
class recapitalizations and other deviations from one share  one vote. Moreover, I consider the 
agency costs of deviations from one share-one vote and examine whether they justify regulation. In 
section III, I analyze the rules implementing the one share  one vote standard in the US and 
Europe. In particular, I analyze the self-regulatory rules of US exchanges, the relevant provisions of 
the European Takeover Directive (including the well known break-through rule), and the Euro-
pean Court of Justices position as to golden shares (which also are deviations from the one share-
one vote standard). In section IV, I draw some conclusions from the analysis of the economic and 
legal issues considered in the preceding sections, and try to answer the main question of this paper.
2. The High Level Group and the Breakthrough Rule 
Interest in the study of one share  one vote was renewed in Europe by the first Report of the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (Winter Report)
1 and by discussions on the new pro-
posal for a Takeover Directive presented by a Commission Communication of 2 October 2002. The 
previous proposal had been rejected by the European Parliament on 4 July 2001, despite agreement 
having been reached on a compromise text within the Conciliation Committee. The European Par-
liament, in particular, rejected the principle whereby, in order to take defensive measures in the face 
of a bid, the board of the offeree company must first obtain the approval of shareholders
2. The re-
jection was motivated by the absence of a level playing field between European Companies facing a 
takeover bid also with respect to US corporations
3.
2.1 The Winter Groups Recommendations 
The Winter Group explored ways to level the playing field for corporate takeovers in Europe, 
while keeping the principle of shareholders approval of post-bid defences. As a result, the Group 
1 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels, 10 
January 2002. 
2 On this principle and its rationale, P. Davies and K. Hopt, Control Transactions, in R. Kraakman et al., 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 2004) p. 157 et seq. 
3 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2002 Proposal for a Directive on Takeover Bids. 3
proposed, in its first Report, a break-through rule based on two guiding principles: one requir-
ing that, in takeover bids, the ultimate decision is always with shareholders; the other positing pro-
portionality between risk bearing and control, i.e. the share capital which has an unlimited right to 
participate in the profits or residue on liquidation should normally carry control rights
4. These prin-
ciples were to be applied also to company law mechanisms and structures which may frustrate a 
bid and which may already be in place prior to the bid
5; briefly stated, to pre-bid defences. To 
achieve a similar purpose, the Report recommended introducing a rule that allowed the offeror to 
break-through such mechanisms and structures in the case of a takeover bid. In particular, a suc-
cessful bidder should have the ability to break-through any mechanisms which frustrate the exer-
cise of proportionate control
6.
As to the proposed rules scope, the same should have applied to all provisions in the articles 
of association and related constitutional documents of the company which deviated from the princi-
ples of shareholder decision-making and proportionality
7. In particular, the following provisions 
should have been overridden: (i) voting caps, multiple or double voting rights, non-voting shares, 
voting rights attributed to nonrisk bearing capital; (ii) provisions preventing the exercise of core 
control rights, including the right to appoint board members and to amend the articles of association 
and other constitutional documents. 
As a result, under the recommended approach, the bidder acquiring 75 per cent or more of the 
risk bearing capital should have been able to control the affairs of the company and the operation of 
its business
8. For instance, the bidder who acquired 80 per cent of the share capital, including non-
voting shares representing 40 per cent of the total, could have voted for 80 per cent of the capital 
thanks to the rule in question. 
2.2 Main Criticisms 
The break-through rule was criticised on various grounds
9. First of all, those losing superior 
voting power upon application of the rule would not be compensated by those gaining voting power 
(an objection that was overcome by the break-through rule included in the Takeover Directive, 
which requires compensation: see section III, para. 2). In addition, it was not clear why the pro-
posed rule should be applicable in the case of a takeover and not at an earlier stage. These objec-
tions were explained by L. Bebchuk and O.Hart with an example referred to the Swedish Company, 
4 See Report, note 1, p. 20 et seq. 
5 Ibidem, p. 29. 
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem, p. 30. 
8 Ibidem, p. 32 et seq. 
9 See E. Berglöf and M. Burkart, European Takeover Regulation (2003) 36 Economic Policy 173.  4
Ericsson
10. The company had two classes of shares: A shares, which had the majority of votes but 
less than 10 per cent of the cash flow rights, and B shares which were entitled to the remaining 
votes and rights. Under the Winter Groups proposal, a bidder acquiring all the B shares would be 
able to gain control; in other words, the B shares would take the superior voting power away from 
the A shares
11. However, A shares traded at a premium over B shares, reflecting their superior vot-
ing power. If the proposed break-through rule were adopted, A shareholders would lose their con-
trol premium without compensation
12. As a result, dual-class structures would be easily undone
13.
Moreover, companies making recourse to the capital markets would no longer use dual-class 
structures (consisting of either multiple voting shares or non-voting shares). They would rather em-
ploy mechanisms not subject to the proposed  break-through rule, such as pyramidal groups
14.
Pyramids also separate ownership from control, allowing the controllers to own a lower share of 
cash flow rights than would otherwise be necessary. However, it is more difficult for regulators to 
fight pyramids, as corporate groups should generally be permitted, whilst it may be hard to define 
pyramids and limit their use by listed companies
15.
Further criticism was advanced by J. Coates expressing doubts about the break-through rule 
on grounds of empirical research
16. He suggested that companies with dual-class structures are rela-
tively rare in the EU. As shown by M. Bennedsen and K. Nielsen, out of 5,162 public companies in 
the EU , only 20 percent had dual-class structures at the time of their analysis
17. According to their 
10 L. Bebchuk and O. Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares, FT May 31, 2002, 11. 
11 Bebchuk and Hart, note 10, 11. 
12 See Report, note 1, p. 35, admitting, however, that in exceptional cases compensation for loss of control 
rights would be appropriate. 
13 Bebchuk and Hart suggest that the following mechanism could be used. A shell company (BH) is set up, 
with the same total number of shares as Ericsson. BH would then make a takeover bid for all of Ericssons A 
and B shares, offering each shareholder of Ericsson shares in BH on a one-for-one basis. This offer would 
succeed since BH would obtain most of the cash flow rights of Ericsson and, according to the break-through 
rule, would have control. The dual class structure would be undone and the A shareholders would lose their 
control premium. 
14 Ibidem; E. Berglöf and M. Burkart, note 9, at 202. 
15 See, for this argument, G. Ferrarini, Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the Contestability of Corporate 
Control, in  Company Law Reform in OECD Countries. A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=265429. 
16 J. Coates, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?, in G. 
Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (Eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe
(Oxford 2004) p. 682 et seq. See also P. Mülbert, Make It or Break It: The Break-Through Rule as a Break-
Through for the European Takeover Directive, ibidem, p. 711, arguing that the rationale for a strict one 
share  one vote regime is difficult to defend given the mandatory bid rule which, in his opinion, should 
cover also non-voting shares. A different solution was, however, adopted in the European Takeover Direc-
tive: see Article 5(1) on mandatory bids referring to securities and Article 1(1)(e) defining the latter as 
transferable securities carrying voting rights in a company. 
17 M. Bennedsen and K. Nielsen, The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms, Working Paper 
(2003), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=328020. These authors mainly refer to data from M. Faccio and L. Lang, 
The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations (2002) Journal of Financial Economics, 65. 5
estimates, in 3-5 percent of these companies the controlling owners would have incurred a direct 
loss of control under the break-through rule, whereas in an additional 11-17 percent of the same the 
controlling owners would be likely to incur a control loss
18. Coates concluded that, in all, only 4 per 
cent of all public firms would have been put at-risk of takeover by the proposed rule and that this 
figure in any case overstates the potential value of the rule
19. In fact, companies would dynami-
cally respond to the adoption of the break-through rule. For instance, large shareholders of vulner-
able companies would increase their holdings of cash-flow rights above the 25 percent threshold, so 
that no bidder could acquire sufficient cash flow rights to trigger the break-through rule
20. An alter-
native could be switching to a pyramid or cross-holding structure which produces a similar result
21.
Coates further argued that the break-through rule would not create a level playing field in 
Europe. First of all, the fact that dual-class structures are equivalent to pyramids and cross-holdings 
means that disproportionality can make takeover defences cheaper at a range of public companies, 
some of which will, and most of which will not, be affected by the BTR [break-through rule]
22. He 
suggests that no more than 12.5 per cent of EU public firms with disproportional capital structures 
would be affected by the rule
23. Moreover, the bulk of the concentration of voting control among 
public firms in the EU does not result from disproportionality, but from the fact that controlling 
shareholders retain a control block in an ordinary one share  one vote capital structure
24.
3. Further Developments 
As a result of similar critiques and, above all, of the pressure exercised by powerful interest 
groups, including some prominent families of European capitalism, the Winter Groups recommen-
dations had limited influence on the European Takeover Directive
25. The break-through rule in-
cluded in this Directive is a default rule, as I better explain in sec. III, para. 2: Member States can 
opt-out of it, while listed companies will be allowed to opt-in. As a result, the rules impact will be 
negligible. Yet, the discussion on one share  one vote is bound to continue in Europe, for several 
reasons. Firstly, institutional investors welcome adherence to this standard by listed companies. 
Also the corporate governance codes tend to support the one share  one vote principle, although 
18 17, 10 et seq. 
19 Coates, note 16, p. 683-684. 
20 Ibidem.
21 Ibidem.
22 Ibidem, 686. 
23 Ibidem.
24 Ibidem.
25 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, 
(2004) OJ L142/12. For a comment, see V. Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids  Not Worth the Pa-
per Its Written On? (2004) ECFR 416. 6
many favour some flexibility in this respect
26. Secondly, the Commission, in defining its Company 
Law Action Plan, declared that it intends to undertake a study on the consequences that further im-
plementation of the principle of proportionality between capital and control, advocated by the Win-
ter Group, would entail
27. Thirdly, recent developments in Member States show some convergence 
towards Anglo-American standards, including one share  one vote, as I briefly explain in sec. III, 
para. 4. Fourthly, significant deviations from one share  one vote persist in some Member States, 
such as Sweden and France where listed companies make extensive recourse to multiple-voting
28
and double-voting shares respectively
29.
II. E CONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY DISCUSSION
1. Should Deviations from One Share – One Vote Be Forbidden? 
In this paragraph, I examine the US debate on whether one share  one vote should be man-
dated by regulation. This debate took place about twenty years ago when the NYSE listing rules, 
which included a rigid one share - one vote standard, were reviewed and common standards were 
adopted for the US stock exchanges and Nasdaq (on these standards see section III below). 
1.1 Is One Share  One Vote always Optimal? 
Economists dealt with this question in a series of theoretical papers the most frequently cited 
of which is probably one by S. Grossman and O. Hart
30. The main argument advanced by 
Grossman - Hart is that the ease with which a take-over can occur depends on a variety of factors 
(such as the range of defensive measures available to management, the attitude of courts, etc.) in-
26 See Comparative Study of the Corporate Governance Codes relevant to the European Union and its Mem-
ber States, http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-
rpt_en.htm. 
27 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union  A Plan to Move Forward, 
Brussels, 21.5.2003 COM (2003) 284 final, at 14. 
28 See, for an illustration and defence of Swedish dual class structures, R. Skog, the European Unions pro-
posed takeover directive, the breakthrough rule and the Swedish system of dual class common stock 
(2003) Riv. Soc. 1141. 
29 See, for an overview of European practices, Deminor Rating, Application of the One Share  One Vote 
Principle in Europe, March 2005 (Report commissioned by ABI  Association of British Insurers). 
30 S. Grossman and O. Hart, One Share  One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control (1988) 20 J. Fin. 
Econ. 175. This papers ideas were subsequently incorporated in O. Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial 
Structure (Oxford 1995) p. 186 et seq., which connects the same with other aspects of financial contracting 
theory. Other important contributions were made by M. Harris and A. Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting 
Rights and Majority Rules (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 203; G. Jarrel and A. Poulsen, Dual-Class Recapitaliza-
tions as Antitakeover Mechanisms. The Recent Evidence (1988) ibid. 129; R. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class 
Exchange Offers (1988) ibid. 153. 7
cluding a companys security voting structure, i.e. how the companys votes are allocated across se-
curities. They show, in particular, that under a given set of circumstances one share - one vote is the 
optimal security-voting structure. In a more recent work, Hart 
31 makes a distinction between the 
companys public value (i.e. the present value of the future dividend stream to shareholders) and 
its private value, i.e. the private benefits enjoyed by the companys managers. He also assumes 
that a company has two classes of shares each entitled to 50 per cent of the dividends: Class A 
shares have no vote; class B shares have all the votes. He further supposes that the companys pub-
lic value under the incumbent managers is 200, each class being worth 100, and that there is a less 
efficient management team wanting to take over the company. Under this rival team, the public 
value of the company is 180 (instead of 200). However, the rival has private benefits of 15, whereas 
the incumbents private benefits are negligible. Therefore, if the rival gets control, the value of the 
company is reduced by 20 (as the new management team is less efficient). Yet, the rival could make 
a tender offer for all Class B shares at a premium of 1, for example. In the absence of a counter-
offer and assuming that shareholders are disperse, they would face the well known prisoners di-
lemma: either keeping their shares (which are now worth 100 but would be worth 90 if the rival 
wins) or tendering the same for 101. Given that co-ordination amongst small shareholders is lack-
ing, all shareholders would tender and the rival wins. Clearly, the rival pays 101 for shares which 
are worth 90 under its management; however, his loss of 11 is more than offset by his private bene-
fit of 15. Shareholders as a whole lose, since class B shareholders are bought out for 101, while 
class A shareholders end up owning shares worth 90 (for a total value of 191)
32.
Assuming that the same company had a one share - one vote structure, the rival would not get 
control. In fact, he should offer more than 200 to get all shareholders to tender to him, but this 
would imply a capital loss of 20 (200-180) against a private benefit of 15. If the private benefit were 
more than 20, then the rival would offer and win; however, shareholders would not lose as all of 
them could be bought out at a premium (say, for a total of 202, against a total value of 191 in the 
previous case of a dual class structure)
33.
The same example is modified to show that a superior rival (rather than an inefficient one) 
would be prevented from obtaining control by a dual-class structure
34. The public value under the 
incumbent is still 200, but under the rival it is now 220 and the incumbents private benefit is 15, 
while the rivals private benefit is negligible. In a similar situation and assuming a dual class struc-
ture such as the one referred to above, the maximum that the rival could offer for Class B shares is 
31 See Hart, note 30, p. 187 et seq. 
32 Ibidem, p. 190. 
33 Ibidem.
34 Ibidem, p. 191. 8
110 (220 : 2, in the absence of significant private benefits). However, the incumbent could counter-
offer a higher price (for example, 111), given that her capital loss (of 11) would be offset by her 
private benefit of 15. Assuming, on the contrary, a one share - one vote structure, the rival would 
win as he could offer up to 220 and the incumbent would tender as the shares are worth only 215 to 
her.
Therefore, Grossman - Hart conclude that, if only one of the management teams has a signifi-
cant private benefit, one share - one vote is optimal. However, they also argue that, if both teams 
have a significant private benefit, a departure from one share - one vote may increase the total value 
of the company
35. The simple intuition behind this conclusion is that shareholders benefit when 
the rival and incumbent compete over products for which they have a similar willingness to pay
36.
In other words, competition between rivals and incumbents is higher if they derive substantial bene-
fits from control and need to focus on one class of shares only (class B in the examples made). 
Therefore, if we consider the initial owner before his company goes public, he will prefer a one 
share - one vote structure whenever it is unlikely that both the incumbent and the rival have sub-
stantial private benefits. Otherwise, he will choose a security-voting structure which departs form 
one share - one vote so as to allow the companys value to be maximized in a contest for control. 
Grossman - Hart believe that there is a higher probability of cases in which only one party (either 
the incumbent or the rival) has substantial private benefits. Yet, they concede that the level of mi-
nority protection may vary from country to country influencing the measure and distribution of pri-
vate benefits of control
37. If we consider countries where private benefits are generally substantial 
because of weak investor protection, we might expect, in these countries, frequent departures from 
one share - one vote
38.
Grossman - Hart also draw some conclusions with respect to the policy debate on whether a 
company should be required to adopt a one share - one vote structure as a condition for listing on a 
stock exchange
39. To this end, they make a distinction between the deviations from one share - one 
vote occurring before the company goes public and those taking place at a later stage when the 
companys shareholders are dispersed. With respect to the former type of deviations, it is argued 
that an initial owner has an incentive to choose a value-maximizing security-voting structure since 
he bears the full consequences of his actions through the effect on the prices of the companys secu-
rities
40. As we have seen already, in some cases the initial owner may find it wealth-maximizing to 
35 See Grossman and Hart, note 30, at 180. 
36 Hart, note 30, p. 201. 
37 Ibidem.
38 See para. 2.2 of this section. 
39 Grossman and Hart, note 30, 200 et seq. 
40 Hart, note 30, at 208. 9
depart from one share - one vote. The second type of deviations is, on the contrary, suspect as the 
managers of a dispersed ownership company have not the same incentives as an initial owner, since 
the consequences of their actions are borne by the companys shareholders
41. Therefore, the manag-
ers could seek changes in the security-voting structure simply to entrench themselves, while reduc-
ing the companys value. However, Grossman - Hart recognize that this observation is less forceful 
with respect to a corporation in which the managers are already controlling shareholders and want 
to change the voting structure. They make the example of a family  controlled company wishing to 
raise capital for other projects. The family does not want to lose voting control, so that the company 
creates a class of shares with lower dividend claims, but more votes than the common shares to al-
low the family to keep control. Grossman - Harts comment is that, if the initial shareholders ex-
pected the family to maintain voting control, the change in security structure should not be inter-
fered with
42.
1.2 Dual Class Recapitalizations as a Problem 
At the time when the economic theory just examined was developed, lawyer-economists ex-
amined dual class structures on a more specific ground. The interest for these structures was raised 
by the New York Stock Exchanges proposal to end its prohibition on listing the securities of com-
panies with dual class of common stock. Attention was focussed on dual class recapitalizations, par-
ticularly on transactions by which a publicly held company changed its capital structure to replace a 
single class of voting stock with two classes, one of which had multiple votes per share and usually 
carried dividend rights lower than the pre-existing class of common stock. The multiple voting 
shares were assigned to management or an existing shareholder group, the official justification be-
ing that centralizing control in those receiving the class with superior voting rights would increase 
the value of the company and, as a result, that of the shares with limited voting rights
43.
As noted by R. Gilson, in complete capital markets (assuming, in other words, no transaction 
costs) the dual class transaction just described would have a familiar substitute: a leveraged buyout 
(LBO), which also serves to shift control to managers or an existing shareholder group
44. In perfect 
capital markets, non-controlling shareholders would get the same portion of gain from either an 
LBO or a dual class recapitalization and, therefore, would be indifferent as to the choice of transac-
41 Ibidem.
42 Grossman and Hart, note 30, at 201. 
43 See D. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock (1987) 54 U. 
Chicago L. Rev. 119; J. Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, 
One Vote Controversy (1986) 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687. 
44 See R. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes (1987) 73 Virginia 
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tion. However, in the real world, transaction and information costs may result in the systematic se-
lection of other than the least-cost transaction form
45. Otherwise stated, public shareholders may 
be disadvantaged by the choice of a transaction form that is more beneficial to the managers or a 
given shareholder group. In this respect, Gilson reviews the empirical studies concerning dual class 
recapitalizations and LBOs and concludes that two interesting patterns appear in the data. First, 
shareholder wealth is largely increased as a result of LBOs, while it is, at best, unaffected by dual 
class transactions. Second, pre-existing dominant shareholder groups are present in companies sub-
ject to dual class proposals and not in companies subject to LBO proposals. Gilson finds two possi-
ble explanations for these patterns. One is more benign and looks at the two types of companies 
potentially subject wither to LBOs (cash cows) or to dual class transactions (question marks). 
Companies of the second type suffer from a capital shortage, are in an earlier stage of development 
and operate in markets that are growing quickly
46. The second explanation looks at the dark side 
of the data and finds coercion of public shareholders, in the sense that dominant shareholders im-
pose a wealth transfer from disperse shareholders to themselves
47. This dark side story has been de-
veloped most thoroughly by J. Gordon and R. Ruback who argue that, even where the dominant 
shareholder group has not absolute voting control, strategic considerations will result in disperse 
shareholders approving the transaction, even if it is not in their best interests
48.
Gilson also tries to draw regulatory implications from the observed empirical patterns. He ar-
gues that a successful regulatory effort would have to eliminate dual class transactions intended to 
coerce public shareholders, without foreclosing those efficient transactions which may be required 
by competitive product markets
49. He suggests that the key to efficient transactions should be that a 
firm is able to raise equity for positive net present value investments without diluting the dominant 
shareholders or increasing their unsystematic risk disproportionately. In contrast, the key to ineffi-
cient transactions would be the ability of a dominant shareholder to coerce other shareholders into 
further strengthening its control
50. Therefore, Gilson concludes that a rule should be adopted to 
prohibit the conversion of existing stock into dual classes, but not the public offering of a new
class of limited voting or non-voting common stock, as this would allow new capital to be raised 
45 Ibidem, at 810. 
46 Ibidem, at 824 et seq. 
47 Ibidem, at 832 et seq. 
48 See J. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice 
(1988) 76 Cal. L. Rev. 3, at 43 et seq., who analyzes the collective action problems affecting shareholder 
voting in dual class recapitalizations; Ruback, note 30, who shows that dual-class exchange offers can induce 
outside shareholders to exchange their shares for limited voting shares though the same shareholders, in the 
same circumstances but acting collectively, would choose not to exchange. 
49 Gilson, note 44, at 841 
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without diluting the control of the dominant group
51. As we shall see, a similar rule was subse-
quently adopted by NYSE and Nasdaq. 
1.3 Summary 
Both the theoretical and the law and economics studies examined above are directly relevant 
to the present discussion. First of all, they show that deviations from one share - one vote should be 
admitted and that, at least in one case, such deviations are not problematic: this is the case of an ini-
tial public offering by a company with a dual class capital structure. The limited voting rights are 
reflected in a reduced price of the relevant class, so that the companys initial owners, and not the 
purchasers of the shares, bear the cost
52. Moreover, although the company, in a similar case, could 
be sheltered from the corporate control market, this is not a change of status and has been clear 
since the offer of the companys shares to the public. The case of a company changing its capital 
structure from one class of shares to two classes is more problematic, as the transaction could be in-
tended mainly to entrench the companys managers. However, the criteria suggested by R. Gilson to 
discriminate between efficient and inefficient transactions should help to devise a rule allowing, 
with some limits, the adoption of a dual class structure. In particular, the issuance of non-voting (or 
limited voting) shares to raise new capital does not appear problematic, while the transformation of 
ordinary shares into non-voting shares is at least suspect, as it could result from a coercion of public 
shareholders by the dominant shareholder group.  
2. The Agency Costs of Deviations from One Share – One Vote 
2.1 Theory and Evidence 
Another strand of research on this papers topics is that concerning the agency costs created 
by dual class structures and similar arrangements separating control from cash flow rights. The no-
tion of controlling-minority is used to identify similar structures, which include dual class schemes, 
stock pyramids (or pyramidal groups), and cross-ownership ties (or cross-holdings). A theoretical 
study by L. Bebchuk, R. Kraakman and G. Triantis analyses the agency costs associated with the 
controlling-minority structure in several contexts
53. They start form the general comment that this 
structure lacks the principal mechanisms limiting agency costs in other ownership structures. First 
of all, controlling-minorities are not exposed to hostile takeovers and proxy contests which contrib-
51 Ibidem.
52 Ibidem, at 809. 
53 L. Bebchuk, R. Kraakman and G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The 
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights, in R. Morck (ed.), Concen-
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ute to discipline management in diffuse-ownership companies. Moreover, controlling minorities 
(unlike controlling majorities) do not internalize most of the value effects of their decisions through 
shareholdings, which may represent only a small fraction of the cash-flow rights in their firms. 
Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis demonstrate that, as the relevant fraction of cash-flow rights 
(which they denominate  ) declines, controlling minorities can externalize progressively more of 
the costs of their misbehaviour and that the agency costs of the interested firms can rise at a sharply 
increasing rate as a result 
54. For instance, in the choice of investment projects, the controller might 
choose, depending on  , the projects with the lower value but the larger private benefits of control. 
Moreover, as   declines, the difference in value between two projects will become less important to 
the controllers relative to the difference in private benefits of control
55. As the same authors ac-
knowledge, however, there are, at least, two factors limiting the agency costs of controlling-
minority structures. The first is reputation: controllers who intend to return to the equity market 
must establish a reputation for sound management. The second is legal  protection of minority 
shareholders: agency costs of dual class and similar structures tend to be comparatively larger in 
countries in which legal rules are lax and private benefits of control are consequently large
56.
Empirical studies support this theory. For instance, research conducted on a sample of 1301 
publicly traded corporations from eight East Asian economies tried to disentangle the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large ownership
57. In addition to being controlled by a single shareholder in 
two-thirds of the cases
58, East Asian firms show a sharp divergence between cash-flow rights and 
control rights, i.e. the largest shareholder is often able to control a public corporation with a rela-
tively small direct stake in its cash-flow rights
59. This is done through pyramid structures, cross-
holdings among firms, and sometimes through dual-class shares. The study in question finds that 
relative firm value (as measured by the market-to-book ratio of assets) increases with the share of 
cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest shareholder
60. This confirms the incentive effects of 
large ownership
61.  The same study, however, shows that the difference between control rights and 
cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder is associated with a value discount and that the discount 
generally increases with the size of the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights
62. This 
54 Ibidem, p. 447 et seq. 
55 Ibidem, p. 451 et seq. 
56 Ibidem, p. 452 et seq.
57 See S. Claessens, S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects 
of Large Shareholdings (2002) 57 J. Fin. 2741. 
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porations (2000) 58 J. Fin. Econ. 81.  
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is a negative entrenchment effect of large ownership: increases in control rights are accompanied by 
declines in firm value
63.
A study on US dual-class companies reached similar results
64. The authors find that that firm 
value (as measured by Tobins Q) is increasing in cash-flow ownership and decreasing in voting 
ownership
65 and offer the following explanation: some firms adopt dual-class structures when 
their original owners are reluctant to cede control; later, these firms are less likely to tap capital 
markets (so as to avoid diluting control) and thus invest less, grow slower, and are valued lower
66.
A more recent study on a sample of 675 European public companies from 11 countries shows simi-
lar results as to the relation between firm value and the wedge between the voting and the cash-flow 
rights of the largest shareholder
67. The authors find their evidence consistent with the international 
one showing a negative association between corporate valuation and the control-enhancing devices 
used by the largest shareholder
68.
2.2 Policy Implications 
Given that deviations from one share  one vote increase agency costs, it might appear desir-
able to limit the recourse to similar structures
69. As I indicate below, some EU Member States re-
strict the use of dual-class structures, while the US tax laws discourage recourse to pyramidal 
groups. However, as shown by L. Bebchuk, this is not necessarily a desirable policy approach. If 
controlling-minority structures were prohibited or discouraged, this would not imply that companies 
would choose to go public with a dispersed ownership structure: They might instead choose to re-
main closely held and avoid going public altogether
70. Indeed, if going public were only possible 
through non-controlling shareholder  structures and if private benefits of control were high, the 
firms owners might not want to leave control up for grabs
71. An alternative policy approach to 
deviations from one share  one vote would be to reduce private benefits of control through corpo-
rate law reform. However, the introduction of new rules and enforcement of the same could be 
63 Ibidem, 2770. 
64 P. Gompers, J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies, 
NBER Working Paper No. 10240, January 2004. 
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costly and the relevant costs should be compared with the benefits of  eliminating controlling-
minority structures
72.
III. C OMPARING US AND EU APPROACHES
In this section, I briefly analyse how and to what extent the one share  one vote standard was 
implemented in the US and in the EU and its Member States. I consider, in particular, the listing re-
quirements introduced by US stock exchanges and Nasdaq (after repeal of the strict one share  one 
vote standard enforced for more than 50 years by the New York Stock Exchange) and the way in 
which pyramidal groups were discouraged in the US through tax reform. I further examine the 
European Takeover Directive, its rules on transparency of ownership structures and the break-
through rule included in the same as a default rule. I also consider the cases decided by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice concerning golden shares, their relevance from the one share  one vote stan-
dards perspective and the partial convergence of national company laws in this area.  
1. US Approach 
1.1 Listing Requirements 
According to the main treatise on US securities regulation, the one share  one vote contro-
versy began in 1925
73. By the end of the 19
th century, common and preferred stock had equal voting 
rights. However, in the first quarter of the following century corporate stock issues showed an in-
creasing tendency to restrict the voting rights of certain classes of shareholders
74. As noted by A. 
Berle and G. Means, a number of legal devices developed to form controlling minorities, such as 
pyramiding, non-voting preferred stock and the voting trust
75. In 1925, some leading corporations 
(including Dodge Brothers and Industrial Rayon Corporation) issued non-voting common stock
76.
This caused public outcry, initially inspired by Harvard economist William Ripley, who in-
voked regulation of the subject arguing that banks were assuming control of business corpora-
tions
77. In 1926, the NYSE first disapproved an issue of non-voting common stock, a policy which 
was subsequently hardened and specified
78. The rationale for such a policy was explained by the 
NYSE Listed Company Manual making reference to a long-standing commitment to encourage 
72 Bebchuk, note 69, 31. 
73 L. Loss and J. Seligman, Securities Regulation (New York 3
rd ed. 2003) p. 1833. 
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high standards of corporate democracy as reflected by individual standards of corporate responsi-
bility, integrity and accountability to shareholders
79. However, a similar policy was not followed 
by NASDAQ and AMEX, which therefore competed against NYSE by attracting companies with 
dual class shares structures. This caused concern to NYSE particularly when, in the eighties, listed 
companies enhanced their search for effective takeover defences including the issuance of either 
non-voting or multiple voting stock
80. Under pressure from key political figures threatening enact-
ment of a federal rule, the two exchanges and NASD held discussions to find a common approach 
to one share  on vote. However, these discussions failed and NYSE adopted a proposal permitting 
dual class structures for its listed companies. 
As a result, the SEC held a public hearing to examine whether the Commission could, by its 
own initiative, insert a one share  one vote rule in the self-regulatory rules of the exchanges and 
NASD. In the end, a similar rule was enacted by the SEC (Rule 19c-4) prohibiting the listing on an 
exchange or the inclusion in NASDAQ of the equity securities of an issuer that issued securities or 
took other corporate action that would have the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately re-
ducing the per share voting rights of one or more classes of outstanding common stock of the issu-
er
81. The Rule, however, permitted initial public offerings of stock with disparate voting rights or 
subsequent public offerings of lesser voting stock, and the issuance of stock with lesser voting 
rights in an acquisition. Yet, dual class recapitalizations were prohibited. In this respect, the SEC 
commented:   there may be valid business or economic reasons for issuing disparate voting 
rights stock, the effect of which is not disenfranchising existing shareholders. The Commission be-
lieves, however, that disparate voting rights plans that disenfranchise existing shareholders are in-
consistent with the requirements of the [Williams] Act
82. Several cases of disparate voting rights 
were included in the prohibition, such as restrictions based on the length of time a shareholder has 
held stock (exemplified in the Europe by the French model of double voting shares) and voting caps 
(popular in some European countries: see para. 2.3). Rule 19c-4 was subsequently vacated by the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals as having been issued in excess of the Commissions man-
date
83. Nonetheless, the exchanges and NASDAQ voluntarily adopted an equivalent to former Rule 
19c-4 as part of their own rules
84.
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1.2 Double Taxation  
Another way to implement the one share - one vote principle in the US was introducing, in the 
1930s, the double taxation of inter-corporate dividends
85. An explicit purpose of this reform by 
President Roosevelt was to force the dismantling of pyramidal groups. These are corporate groups 
in which a wealthy family or individual typically controls a family firm, which controls a majority 
voting block in a publicly traded company that, in turn, holds majority voting blocks of other pub-
licly traded companies: Pyramidal corporate groups allow wealthy individuals or families to con-
trol corporate assets worth vastly more than their corporate wealth
86. In other terms, pyramidal 
groups are means to separate ownership from control and to deviate from one share  one vote stan-
dards
87. Roosevelts objectives were summarized by contemporary scholars as follows: There can 
be no denying that the Presidents message was an attack upon wealth; he and his followers would 
say, not upon innocent wealth, but upon concentrated, monopolistic, tax-evading, unsocial wealth, 
and particularly upon that taken from the masses by the vicious, pyramided, consciousless holding 
companies
88. Roosevelts reform was successful, for pyramidal groups are currently unknown in 
the US
89.
2. EU Approaches
2.1 The European Takeover Directive 
The European Takeover Directive does not include a clear policy in favour of one share  one 
vote. Deviations from this principle are admitted and may substantially limit the contestability of 
corporate control. Yet, similar deviations must be disclosed by listed companies publishing detailed 
information as to the structure of their capital  with an indication of the different classes of 
shares and, for each class of shares, the rights and obligations attaching to it and the percentage of 
total shares capital that it represents (Article 10(1)(a)). Information should also be published as to 
the holders of any securities with special control rights (e.g. golden shares) and to any restric-
tions on voting rights, such as limitations of the voting rights of holders of a given percentage or 
number of votes, deadlines for exercising voting rights, or systems whereby, with the companys 
85 R. Morck, Why Some Double Taxation Might Make Sense: The Special Case of Inter-corporate Divi-
dends (March 20, 2003), University of Alberta Centre for Financial Research Working Paper No. 03-01, 
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cooperation, the financial rights attaching to securities are separated from the holding of securities 
(Article 10(1)(d) and (f)). Clearly this provision makes reference to voting caps and to the use 
(which was common in the Netherlands until recently) of depositary receipts for shares as an anti-
takeover device (see para. 2.3).
As commented by H. Hirte, Article 10 of the Takeover Directive goes far beyond the regula-
tion and/or harmonization of takeovers; it is, in fact, a Mini-Directive on the structure of the Cor-
poration which takes up many of the issues that the draft Fifth Directive failed to harmonize
90.
Yet, the provision includes transparency requirements, rather than harmonizing substantive law, and 
is therefore less intrusive, even if these requirements are in no way neutral, for they are implicitly 
based on the one share  one vote system, insofar as deviations from this line ought to be dis-
closed
91. Hirte concludes that Article 10 has a greater impact on the harmonization of European 
company laws than most other articles of the Takeover Directive, and establishes one share  one 
vote as a European standard
92. This conclusion, however, should not be overstretched: arguing that 
one share  one vote is the background model for disclosure requirements is still far from showing 
that it is already a principle of European law. 
Indeed, the breakthrough rule story highlights that one share  one vote is an aspirational 
principle more than an effective one. A rule similar to that suggested by the Winter Group is, in 
fact, included in Article 11 of the Directive with reference to pre-bid defences in general; however, 
Member States are allowed to opt-out of this rule. For what concerns voting rights, in particular, Ar-
ticle 11(3) states that restrictions on those rights provided for in the articles of association of the of-
feree company (as well as restrictions on voting rights provided for in contractual agreements be-
tween the offeree company and holders of its securities, or in contractual agreements between hold-
ers of the offeree companys securities entered into after the adoption of the Directive) shall not 
have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in ac-
cordance with Article 9. Therefore, if the articles of association include a voting cap, this will not be 
applicable in the shareholders meeting which decides on post-bid defences. Similarly, if the com-
pany has issued non-voting shares, their holders will be entitled to vote in that meeting. As to mul-
tiple-vote securities, Article 11(3) last sentence states that they shall carry only one vote at the 
above mentioned meeting. In essence, the one share one vote principle will govern resolutions as 
to post-bid defences, reducing the scope for entrenchment of the companys managers and block-
holders.
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Moreover, under Article 11(4), the same principle applies whenever, following a bid, the of-
feror holds 75% or more of the capital carrying voting rights, with reference to the first general 
meeting of shareholders following closure of the bid, called by the offeror in order to amend the ar-
ticles of association or to remove or appoint board members. In this meeting, therefore, voting caps 
will not apply; non-voting shares will vote, while multiple-voting shares will carry only one vote; 
furthermore, extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or removal of board 
members provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company shall not apply. 
The directive also takes care of the objections raised with respect to the breakthrough rule as 
recommended by the Winter Report, which excluded, save for exceptional cases, any compensation 
to the holders of rights affected by the rule
93. Art. 11(5), in fact, provides that equitable compensa-
tion shall be provided for any loss suffered by the holders of those rights under the terms set by the 
Member States. Moreover, paragraphs 3 and 4 do not apply to those securities for which the re-
strictions on voting rights are compensated for by specific pecuniary advantages (Article 11(6)), 
the assumption being that, where non-voting shares carry a preference, their holders do not deserve 
special protection under the breakthrough rule, as they have been compensated in advance for the 
loss of the voting rights. However, this argument is rather simplistic, as it also assumes that the 
preferential rights value is always equal to that of the excluded voting rights, which is not necessar-
ily the case. In fact, the value of voting rights depends on that of private benefits of control which 
can be extracted, in a given company, by those managing the same
94. Furthermore, if the preferen-
tial rights are not a sufficient compensation for the loss of the voting rights, the non-voting shares 
will be treated at a discount with respect to common shares to reflect the lower value of the former. 
However, Member States may opt-out of the breakthrough rule under Article 12(1) allowing 
them to reserve the right not to require companies  which have their registered offices within 
their territories to apply Article 9(2) and (3) [on shareholder approval of post-bid defences] and/or 
Article 11. Yet, where Member States make use of this option, they shall nevertheless grant com-
panies which have their registered offices within their territories the option, which shall be reversi-
ble, of applying Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11 (Article 12(2)). Listed companies, therefore, 
shall be granted an opt-in right with respect to the breakthrough rule by those Member States opt-
ing-out of the same. What is the incentive for companies to opt-in, when they would not otherwise 
be bound by the breakthrough rule? The answer is reciprocity
95: Member States may, under the 
conditions determined by national law, exempt companies subject to the breakthrough rule from 
applying the same (as well as Article 9(2) and (3) on defensive measures) when they become the 
93 See Report, note 1, p. 35. 
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target of an offer launched by a company which does not apply the same Articles as they do, or by 
a company controlled, directly or indirectly by the latter  (Article 12(3)).  
It is difficult to forecast how many Member States will adopt the breakthrough rule when im-
plementing the Takeover Directive. It is easy to predict, however, that most of them will opt-out of 
the rule, the reason being that many Member States see at least one or more of the relevant takeover 
defences (including the departures from one share  one vote) widely used in their corporate prac-
tice, so that strong opposition to the breakthrough rule will emerge from interest groups. As a result, 
a large number of European listed companies will be entitled to opt-in, a faculty which will pre-
sumably be exercised only be those companies which are less likely to be affected by the break-
through rule. These could be either companies with diffuse shareholdings or controlled companies 
which already fully comply, in both cases, with the one share  one vote principle (i.e. have no dual 
class shares nor voting caps; do not belong to pyramidal groups; and are not governed by share-
holder agreements). All this shows that the impact of the Directives breakthrough rule will be 
minimal. 
2.2  Golden Shares and the EC Treaty 
The breakthrough rule does not apply to golden shares and similar rights. Article 11(7) speci-
fies it, firstly, with regard to securities in the offeree company which confer special rights on the 
Member States ; secondly, with respect to special rights provided for in national law . The 
first concept refers to golden shares as originally adopted in the UK, where the articles of associa-
tion of privatised companies used to provide for the issuance of special shares to the State. The sec-
ond concept refers to the practice of privatisations in countries like France and Italy, where the law 
foresees that special rights (similar to those deriving from golden shares) may be attributed to the 
State with respect to privatised companies
96. In both cases, a problem arises of compatibility of the 
Member States special rights with the EC Treaty. To the extent that a Member State is entitled, for 
instance, to authorize either transfers of control in the relevant company or mergers of the same 
with another company, the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty may be restricted as a result. 
This has been recognised by the European Court of Justice in a series of cases concerning 
golden shares and the privatisation laws of several Member States
97. The Court focussed attention 
on Article 56 of the EC Treaty stating that all restrictions on the movement of capital between 
96 See S. Grundmann and F. Möslein, Golden Shares  State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative 
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Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. In the case of 
Commission v. France
98, for instance, the Court examined, from the perspective of free movement 
of capital, the golden share in Société Nationale Elf-Acquitaine, whereby any holding of shares or 
voting rights which exceeded certain limits had to be authorized in advance by the French govern-
ment and a decision to transfer or use as security the majority of the capital of four subsidiaries 
could be opposed in advance by the same government. The Court specified that Article 73b [now 
56 EC] lays down a general prohibition on restrictions on the movement of capital between Member 
States. That prohibition goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment, on grounds of na-
tionality, as between operators on the financial markets
99. On the basis of it, the Court held: Even 
though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment, they are liable to impede the acqui-
sition of shares in the undertaking concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member States from 
investing in the capital of those undertakings. They are therefore liable, as a result, to render the free 
movement of capital illusory 
100. Once ascertained that the rules at issue had to be regarded as a 
restriction on the movement of capital, the Court also considered whether this restriction could be 
justified by reasons referred to in Article 73d(1) of the Treaty [now Article 58(1)(b) EC] or by over-
riding requirements of the general interest, and concluded that it could not
101.
Are the ECJ judgements on golden shares relevant to the general discussion on one share  
one vote? No doubt, golden shares represent a departure from this principle and one that is prohib-
ited under the Treaty, unless justified by the reasons cited above. However, the issue has been ana-
lysed from a more general perspective by S. Grundmann and F. Möslein
102, who argued that the 
ECJ judgements on golden shares could have an impact on company law in general. The thesis ad-
vanced by these scholars is fascinating. According to them, in terms of European law doctrine it is 
universally accepted that at least some form of obligation for private law subjects arises from the 
fundamental freedoms
103. No doubt, private autonomy could be unduly restricted by a general ap-
plication of the Treaty rules to private law subjects: In fact, the ECJ does not review national rules 
with respect to fundamental freedoms, if these  rules are subject to party autonomy and party 
choice
104. Yet,  a similar argument is no longer valid where the (private law) legislator grants 
powers to private law entities that allow a restriction of fundamental freedoms without the consent 
98 ECJ 4.6.2002  Case C-483/99, note 98. 
99 Ibidem, para. 40. 
100 Ibidem, para 41. 
101 Ibidem, para. 45 et seq. 
102 Note 97, at 671 et seq. 
103 Ibidem, 655. 
104 Ibidem.21
of the affected party being required
105. Therefore, techniques such as voting caps and multiple vot-
ing rights should be questioned from the perspective of the free movement of capital, along lines 
similar to those followed by the ECJ even if neither golden shares nor special rights of a Member 
State are involved
106.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that similar conclusions would be shared by the ECJ, particularly in 
light of the judgement issued in the case of Commission v. United Kingdom
107 (after publication of 
the paper by Grundmann and Möslein). In this case, the UK Government argued that the special 
share foreseen by the articles of association of British Airports Authority plc was governed by na-
tional company law. If the special share at issue was open to challenge, so would be in general 
every class of shares with more extensive voting rights than another class of shares issued by the 
same company. In rejecting this argument, the  Court did not assert that private company law 
mechanisms could per se restrict fundamental freedoms. Rather the Court relied on the fact that a 
public authority had approved the BAAs special share under the relevant statute
108. Emphasis was 
put on the involvement of a public authority implicitly showing that, in the Courts opinion, mere 
recourse to company law mechanisms could not (as also argued by the UK government) represent a 
restriction of fundamental freedoms. 
The solution could be different when a deviation from the one share  one vote standard is 
foreseen by mandatory provisions of company law
109. Reference can be made to one member  
one vote rules provided for by national laws on cooperatives. Indeed, the breakthrough rule does 
not apply to cooperatives (see Article 11(7) of the Takeover Directive). This exemption is justified 
by the particular nature of cooperatives, as reflected in their ownership structure
110. Similar reasons 
justify the restriction of free movement of capital brought about by one member  one vote rules. 
Yet, in individual cases, these rules do not appear to be justified from the Treaty perspective . In the 
case, for instance, of the Italian banche popolari it is often argued that they have in fact lost their 
cooperative nature and operate similarly to for-profit banks. This argument can be used to object to 
the one member  one vote standard foreseen by Italian Banking Law for banche popolari, which 
practically operates as a powerful antitakeover device limiting the freedom of establishment and the 
free circulation of capital.
105 Ibidem.
106 Ibidem, 656. 
107 ECJ 13.5.2003  Case C-98/01, note 98. 
108 Ibidem, para. 48 and 49. 
109 See Grundmann and Möslein, note 97, at 673. 
110 See, from a general perspective, H. Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., and 
London) p. 66 et seq. 22
2.3 Convergence in the Member States 
As shown by recent research, the law and practice in European countries is slowly converging 
towards Anglo-American corporate governance standards, including one share   one vote
111.
Firstly, there is convergence towards the abolishment of voting caps
112. This is notably the case of 
German Law which specifies that voting restrictions can only be adopted by non-listed compani-
es
113. A similar provision was recently adopted by Italian Law
114. On the whole, the use of voting 
caps has been decreasing in the last five years in countries of German and French legal origin
115.
Secondly, the use of multiple voting shares is forbidden in Germany and Italy. Moreover, it is de-
clining at European level: by 2004 only one third of the European countries allowed shares with 
multiple voting rights, down from more than one half in the early 1990s
116. Scandinavian countries 
make large use of this type of shares; however, Sweden in 2004 introduced a maximum ratio of 10 : 
1 for the votes that can be attributed to multiple voting shares (clearly not a radical reform, but a 
significant step towards more proportionate governance structures)
117. Thirdly, non-voting shares 
are still allowed in most countries, mainly in the form of preference shares. However, the law gen-
erally restricts the issue of non-voting shares to a maximum percentage of the equity (varying be-
tween 25 and 100 per cent, with 50 per cent in the majority of countries)
118.
It is also interesting to note, from the perspective of convergence towards one share  one 
vote, that the Dutch Corporate Governance Code of 2003 includes new provisions with respect to 
depositary receipts for shares. After acknowledging that depositary receipts for shares are a means 
of preventing minority shareholders from controlling the decision-making process  , the Code 
provides that these receipts shall not be used as an antitakeover measure and requires the trust of-
fices management to issue proxies in all circumstances and without limitation to the holders of 
depositary receipts who so request (see Principle IV.2). 
3. A Brief Comparison 
111 See M. Goergen, M. Martynova and L. Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from 
Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 33/2005, April 2005. See also 
Deminor Rating, note 29.  
112 Ibidem, 26. 
113 See Para. 134 (1) of the German Law on Joint-Stock Companies. 
114 See G. Ferrarini, P. Giudici and M. Stella-Richter, Company Law Reform in Italy: Real Progress? 
(2005) 69 RabelsZ 658. 
115 M. Goergen, M. Martynova and L. Renneboog, note 111, 25, figure 6. 
116 Ibidem, 27. 
117 See R. Skog, A Remarkable Decade: The Awakening of Swedish Institutional Investors, in M. Isaksson 
and R. Skog (Eds.), The Future of Corporate Governance. The Stockholm Symposium 2004 (Stockholm 
2004) p. 141, at p. 147.  
118 Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, note 111, 26. 23
The US and Europe clearly followed different paths. In the US, the one share  one vote story 
dates back to the 1920s reflecting a widespread opposition to any form of concentration of eco-
nomic power, which led the NYSE to adopt one share  one vote as a listing condition and Presi-
dent Roosevelt to fight pyramidal groups through taxation. This approach presumably contributed 
to the formation of diffuse ownership companies and was relaxed only in the 1980s when more 
flexible standards were adopted by the US exchanges and Nasdaq substantially to allow the adop-
tion of pre-bid defences by listed companies. Deviations from one share  one vote were therefore 
admitted, but only in circumstances (such as the public offering of a new class of non-voting stock) 
where the relevant costs would not be born by public shareholders. Other transactions, such as the 
introduction of a voting cap by a company already listed, were precluded as they would cause a 
wealth transfer from one shareholder group to another.  
In Europe, one share  one vote attracted public attention only recently as a result of capital 
market development and the growing influence of institutional investors. This led some Member 
States (like Germany and Italy) to forbid multiple-voting shares and voting caps in listed companies 
and to limit the issuance of non-voting shares, while deference to one share  one vote is sometimes 
paid by corporate governance codes (like the recent Dutch Code). These national developments 
have had repercussions at EU level, where some Member States and interest groups denounced a 
level playing field problem originated by the different treatment of pre-bid defences under national 
laws. The case of multiple voting shares is striking: while German and Italian law forbid their issu-
ance, they are a typical feature of Swedish capitalism and are also diffuse in France where compa-
nies can issue double voting shares. The Takeover Directive will presumably have no impact in this 
respect (as Member States are allowed to opt-out of the breakthrough rule), save for improving the 
transparency of ownership structures including departures from one share  one vote.
IV. E NHANCING HARMONISATION THE EU? 
In order to answer the main question of this paper, it is necessary to establish, first of all, 
whether the issue of one share  one vote should be regulated at national level. Only if a positive 
answer were offered in this respect, would the issue of regulatory harmonisation have to be con-
sidered
119. In this section, I summarize this papers outcomes and argue that harmonization at EU 
level is not needed (except for the transparency of ownership structures which is already regulated 
by the Takeover Directive). 
119 For a similar approach, see K. Hopt, European Takeover Regulation: Barriers to and problems of Har-
monizing Takeover Law in the European Community, in K. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (Eds.), European 
Takeovers – Law and Practice (London 1992) p. 172 et seq. 24
1. Lessons from Economic Analysis 
The study by Grossman  Hart examined above concludes that one share  one vote is fre-
quently, but not always optimal. The two economists consider a company at the IPO stage and ask 
what voting structure should be chosen in order to maximize the total value of the company. They 
assume that the company has a diffuse ownership structure after the offer and that two management 
teams (the incumbent managers and a rival team) consider taking over the company. They argue 
that the optimal voting structure depends on the likely distribution of private benefits between the 
two competing teams: if only one team has private benefits with respect to the target company, one 
share - one vote is optimal; if both teams have private benefits, a dual-class structure is preferable. 
In countries where private benefits of control are high, one might expect frequent deviations from 
one share - one vote. Grossman  Hart conclude that one share - one vote should not be mandated as 
a legal standard at least with respect to the IPO stage. Their conclusions are different with reference 
to deviations taking place at a later stage when the companys shareholders are dispersed, if these 
deviations are effected by the managers to entrench themselves and the relative costs are borne by 
the public shareholders. However, if the managers are already in the companys control, a change in 
the voting structure should not be interfered with.
The policy recommendations made by law and economics scholars are similar. The case of 
IPOs is always non-problematic, as the initial shareholders bear the cost of limited voting structures. 
Dual-class recapitalizations, on the contrary, create problems if they are used to entrench the man-
agers at the expense of public shareholders who see their shares value reduced. The consent given 
by public shareholders to similar transactions could be the result of coercion by the managers. On 
the contrary, if a new class of non-voting shares is issued to allow new capital to be raised without 
diluting the dominant group, the transaction should not be interfered with. 
However, dual-class structures generate agency costs which increase with the size of the 
wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights, as shown by both theoretical and empirical stud-
ies. These agency costs are higher in countries where investor protection is weaker. Moreover, dual-
class structures are more common in these countries for the controllers can obtain higher benefits of 
control. Not infrequently, in similar countries, the initial owners of a company adopt a dual-class 
structure before offering the companys securities to the public, as they do not want to leave control 
up for grabs in situations where the amount of private benefits could attract unfriendly takeover-
bids. On a policy level, the relevant agency costs could be dealt with either by forbidding dual-class 
structures or by increasing investor protection. However, if separating control rights from cash-flow 
rights were not possible, the initial owners could rather choose not to go public, possibly generating 25
social costs higher than those caused by dual-class structures. Also increasing investor protection 
could have a chilling effect if the costs of going public became relatively high. 
2. Lessons from Comparative Analysis 
The US approach to one share  one vote is consistent with the comments just made from an 
economic perspective. While the traditional NYSE rule forbidding all deviations from one share  
one vote overshot the target, the new rule adopted by the US exchanges and Nasdaq discriminates 
between types of transactions along lines similar to those suggested by scholars in the discussions 
leading to self-regulatory reform. Initial public offerings of securities with disparate voting rights 
and subsequent public offerings of lesser voting stock are permitted, while other types of transac-
tions disenfranchising existing shareholders, like the adoption of voting caps by listed companies, 
are forbidden. 
The European approach is diversified. Rules forbidding deviations from one share  one vote 
were only recently adopted in some Member States, but offer partial solutions to the problems at is-
sue. For instance, in Italy multiple voting shares were forbidden a long time ago and voting caps 
were excluded for listed companies by the recent company law reform, while a breakthrough rule 
applies to voting pacts under the Draghi law in the case of a takeover; yet, pyramidal groups are still 
present in Italy and non-voting shares can be issued by joint-stock companies
120. The situation is 
similar in other Member States, where deviations from one share  one vote are relatively com-
mon
121. This may depend on weak investor protection, even though departures from one share  one 
vote do not always correlate to private benefits of control, as shown by the use of multiple voting 
shares in Sweden which is generally considered as a good law country
122. The situation is no 
doubt evolving as a reflection of corporate governance practices and legal reforms introducing An-
glo-American standards; however, path dependence and the rigidity of corporate ownership struc-
tures slow down the transition to one share  one vote as a general standard. 
The European approach is partially consistent with the policy recommendations formulated by 
economists (and received by American law). Deviations from one share  one vote are permitted 
even in countries that forbid some of them. However, no distinction is made in Europe concerning 
the ways in which similar deviations occur. Voting caps, where permitted, can be introduced either 
at the IPO stage or afterwards. Otherwise, they are generally forbidden to listed companies (as is the 
case in Germany and Italy). Similarly, non-voting shares can be issued either through a capital in-
120 See Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques, note 87. 
121 See Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, note 111. 
122 See R. Gilson,  Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy, ECGI Law Working Papers No. 49/2005 (August 2005).  26
crease or by way of conversion of voting stock. Yet, dual-class recapitalizations do not seem to be 
an issue in Europe, possibly as a result of higher corporate ownership concentration. On the con-
trary, the breakthrough rule suggested by the High Level Group and included in the Takeover Di-
rective do not conform to the policy recommendations considered above. To be sure, this rule does 
not mandate one share  one vote, so that deviations are still possible. Moreover, Member States 
can opt-out of this rule. However, where applicable, the breakthrough rule will have an impact simi-
lar to an outright prohibition on voting structures. In fact, controlling shareholders will rather 
choose those structures, such as pyramidal groups and cross-shareholdings, which are not at risk of 
a breakthrough in the case of a takeover.
3. A European Rule? 
In light of the comments made in the preceding two paragraphs, the need for European har-
monisation is in principle excluded. Mandating one share  one vote is not justified by economic ef-
ficiency, as also confirmed by comparative law. If there is no need for regulation at the national 
level, also the European breakthrough rule, which ultimately strikes down all deviations from one 
share  one vote, does not appear to be well grounded. Only transparency rules appear to be justi-
fied also at EU level as disclosure of ownership and voting structures serves a pricing and govern-
ance function
123, while harmonisation of the relevant rules reduces transaction costs in integrated 
markets. 
Some scholars have tried to find a rationale for the breakthrough rule in the European com-
mitment to economic and political integration. According to J. Gordon
124, this rule is aimed to fos-
ter the development of diffusely-held public firms on the assumption that these companies better 
serve the EU integration project. In fact, cross-border takeovers would become easier if corporate 
ownership evolved towards Anglo-American standards, while economic nationalisms would be 
curbed if companies were more easily contestable. Similarly, J. Coates
125 suggested that the best ra-
tionale for the breakthrough rule is that many companies with dual-class structures were established 
long ago when they had already achieved a self-sufficient scale. Now that the EU has liberalised 
markets, scale economies are not being achieved in the most efficient manner (through M&A 
transactions) because controllers are unwilling or in some cases legally unable to sell or share con-
123 See R. Kraakman, Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Overview Essay, in Ferrarini, Hopt, Win-
ter and Wymeersch (Eds.), note 16, p. 95. 
124 An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of Corporate Governance: German Share-
holder Capitalism and the Euroepean Union, 1990  2000 ECGI Law Working Paper No. 06 (February 
2003).
125 Note 16. 27
trol
126. Coates concludes, however, that the breakthrough rule is not necessarily the best remedy 
for such companies and that a better balance could be achieved with a periodic reopening of con-
trol, as recommended by American scholars suggesting that takeover defences be revisited every ten 
or twenty years at a general meeting of shareholders
127.
These two scholars try to justify the breakthrough rule on grounds different from those usually 
referred to for legal harmonisation. If the Member States did not consider anything like this rule for 
their own laws, the reasons traditionally given for harmonisation, such as reduction of transaction 
costs caused by divergent national rules and protectionism inherent in national regulations
128, can-
not be invoked for the breakthrough rule. Nonetheless, the Treatys freedoms do not seem to sup-
port such a drastic regulatory move. As argued above with respect to golden shares, the conclu-
sions reached by the ECJ in the relevant cases could not be extended to all sorts of deviations from 
one share  one vote, as they concern deviations specifically provided for by the law. Similarly, the 
Treaty freedoms could not be invoked to strike down all deviations from one share - one vote under 
the breakthrough rule, as this would unduly restrict private autonomy, while it is not at all clear 
whether structures like dual-class shares are substantial impediments to economic integration in Eu-
rope
129.
126 Ibidem, p. 705. 
127 Ibidem. 
128 See G. Ferrarini, Pan-European Securities Markets: Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses (2002) 3 
EBOR 249. 
129 See section I, para. 2.2, above. I 
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